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Abstract
1
Three experiments on the World Wide Web asked subjects to rate the seriousness of common2
health disorders such as acne or arthritis. People who had a disorder (“Haves”) tended to rate3
it as less serious than people who did not have it (“Not-haves”). Two explanations of this Have4
vs. Not-have discrepancy were rejected. By one account, people change their reference point5
when they rate a disorder that they have. More precise reference points would, on this account,6
reduce the discrepancy, but, if anything, the discrepancy was larger. By another account,7
people who do not have the disorder focus on attributes that are most affected by it, and the8
discrepancy should decrease when people make ratings on several attributes. Again, if anything,9
the discrepancy increased when ratings were on separate attributes (combined by a weighted10
average). The discrepancy varied in size and direction across disorders. Subjects also thought11
that they would be less affected than others.12
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1 Introduction13
Brickman and his colleagues argued that people adapt to their lives, so that the joy of positive14
changes and the despair of negative changes both wear off over time [1, 2]. Paraplegics, after a few15
years, are almost as “happy” as other people. Consistent with these observations, patients with16
chronic health disorders sometimes do not see their disorder as very bad, compared to judgments17
offered by those who have not experienced the disorder [3, 4]. In these studies, patients report18
that their quality of life is significantly better than the public estimates it would be. For example,19
Sackett and Torrance [4] found that the general public estimates the health related quality of life20
(HRQoL) of dialysis at a value of 0.39 (on a scale from 0 for conditions as bad as death to 1 for21
perfect health), whereas dialysis patients estimate their HRQoL at 0.56. Boyd et al. [3] found that22
patients without colostomies estimate the HRQoL of living with a colostomy at 0.80, while patients23
with colostomies rate their own HRQoL at 0.92. A similar discrepancy has been seen between24
rheumatoid arthritis patients and the general public.25
Other studies, however, fail to find such discrepancies (e.g., Llewellyn-Thomas et al. [5];26
O’Connor et al. [6]). These studies often examine short-term conditions, such as the experience of27
radiation therapy, evaluated by the same patients, before and during the experience.28
The question we address here is whether the discrepancy between the ratings of people who29
have and do not have a disorder — the Have–Not-have discrepancy — can be found for common30
disorders in a broad sample of people. We ask this by using questionnaires on the World Wide31
Web, available to anyone. Although our sample is surely not representative of all human beings32
(the population of interest), it is diverse, and it includes many people with the health disorders of33
interest. If the discrepancy can be demonstrated by this sort of method, then future research on it34
is easier than would otherwise be the case.35
We test here two explanations of the Have–Not-have discrepancy. In one, the meaning of the36
response scale changes when people evaluate disorders that they have. A term such as “good37
health,” which might be used for the top of a rating scale, can mean one thing to a normal healthy38
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person — being able to play tennis or ride a bike, for example — and quite another thing to a39
person who has just lost a leg, where it might mean being able to go back to the office. This can40
happen either because people compare themselves to others with similar disorders or because they41
adopt different aspiration levels. In either case, the discrepancy should be reduced by making the42
response scale more explicit, so that the terms used to name the ends of it are not so subject to43
variable interpretation.44
This explanation is similar to the idea of “response shift” [7]. People undergoing cancer therapy,45
in some studies, retrospectively evaluate their pre-therapy condition as better than they rated that46
condition at the time they experienced it [8], or as worse, if their condition improved [9, 10].47
Analogous results are found for transplant patients, who rate their pre-transplant quality of life48
(QOL) as lower after the transplant than they did at the time [11, 12]. Jansen et al. [13], however,49
found no evidence for a response shift.50
Here, in Experiments 1 and 2, we test this explanation by assessing the Have–Not-have discrep-51
ancy with different kinds of response scale, which differ in the clarity of their end point. If a scale52
is defined so that end points have a constant meaning, and the discrepancy is reduced, then the53
use of undefined scales is part of the explanation of it.54
The other explanation holds that the discrepancy is the result of a focusing illusion. When55
imagining the situation of others who have a disorder, people focus disproportionately on what is56
affected by the disorder while ignoring those things that are not affected. In the original demon-57
stration of this focusing illusion, students in both California and the Midwest predict that they58
would be significantly happier living in California than in the Midwest [14]. This prediction cor-59
relates strongly with how important they feel weather is to their quality of life. Yet no significant60
difference in happiness is found between these two groups of students, suggesting that they focus61
disproportionately on the effect of weather on their quality of life when they compare themselves62
to those in a different climate.63
In an earlier study, Ubel et al. [15] explored whether a focusing illusion contributes to general64
public estimates of the QOL associated with disabilities. Subjects estimated the QOL of either65
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paraplegia, below the knee amputation, or partial blindness. Then the experimenters attempted66
to “de-focus” subjects by having them reflect on the impact of these disabilities on a wide range67
of life domains. This de-focusing task should keep people from thinking too narrowly about the68
life domains affected by the disability. For example, subjects were asked to think about how such69
a disability would affect their family life, assuming that for most, it would have little effect. This70
manipulation showed no effect. The focusing hypothesis was not supported.71
Ubel et al. [16] replicated this negative result with three other focusing tasks. One de-focusing72
task involved asking people to imagine how the disability in question would affect eight concrete73
life events, such as “paying bills and taxes” and “reading or watching TV or movies.” Another74
de-focusing task asked people to list those things that took up the largest amount of their time on75
the previous day and then indicate how much the disability in question would impact those things.76
A third de-focusing task asked people to specifically think not only about things that would be77
made worse about the disability in question, but also things that would be unchanged and things78
that would be better because of the disability. None of the tasks affected the magnitude of the79
discrepancy, measured after doing the task.80
Here, we test the focusing illusion in a different way, in Experiment 3, by asking whether the81
Have–Not-have discrepancy is reduced when subjects provide ratings of the disorder attribute by82
attribute. This method insures that subjects attend to all the attributes we provide. It should thus83
prevent focusing, at least to some extent, and reduce the discrepancy, if the focusing explanation84
is at work.85
Also relevant to the focusing illusion is a comparison of different kinds of scales in Experiments86
1 and 2. Scales that concern health should be less subject to a focusing illusion than those that are87
broader, such as those concerning quality of life, or happiness. In fact the Brickman study used a88
happiness scale. We might expect the happiness scale to show the smallest discrepancy.89
In sum, our two main questions are whether the Have–Not-have discrepancy can be reduced by90
the use of well-defined scales (Experiments 1 and 2, which also examine different kinds of scales),91
and by the use of attribute-by-attribute ratings.92
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Experiments 1 and 2 also address a subsidiary question: whether people think that they can93
adapt to a disorder better than others can. In general, people tend to think they are “above94
average” on all good things [19]. Most studies comparing Have and Not-have are asking the Have95
group (those with the disorder) to rate themselves and the Not-have group to rate others. Thus,96
Have–Not-have is confounded with ratings of self and others. The Have–Not-have discrepancy could97
result from a belief that “I can adapt to this better than other people can,” whether or not the98
person answering has the disorder or not. We thus ask for ratings of self with the disorder, self99
without it, others with, and others without. One of the two Self ratings is necessarily hypothetical.100
A Self-Other difference would support this explanation.101
It is also possible that this Self-Other difference is found mainly in those who have the disorder.102
If so, Self-Other would interact with Have–Not-have.103
2 Experiment 1104
The main purpose of this experiment was to look for a discrepancy in the ratings of common105
disorders, in which people who do not have the disorder rate it as more serious than those who106
have it (Not-have vs. Have). The ratings say how much dis-utility a disorder will create. So our107
general hypothesis is that Have’s don’t think things are as bad as Not-have’s think they would108
be. The justification for this hypothesis is that when people have found discrepancies, they have109
typically been in this direction.110
Note that this discrepancy need not always go in this direction. For certain health disorders,111
especially those that primarily effect mood and subjective well being, we expect the discrepancy to112
go in the other direction. Classic examples of these types of disorders would be anxiety, depression113
and pain. And indeed in this study, one of the disorders that involves pain, migraines, showed114
a discrepancy in the opposite direction (Have rated worse than Not-have). Although we know of115
no previous findings of a reversed discrepancy of this sort, Adresen et al.[17] found that people116
who suffered pain as part of their disorder rated their pain as worse than did people who did not117
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have the disorder, and, in a different sort of study, Todorov and Kirchner[18] found that proxies118
under-reported symptoms of people with disabilities.119
A second question was whether a discrepancy could result from vagueness in the judgment scale.120
In particular, if the scale has unclear anchors — that is, unclear standards of comparison — people121
with a health disorder might evaluate having the disorder by comparing themselves to others with122
the disorder, rather than to those without it. This possibility predicts that the discrepancy would123
be larger when the judgment scale is less clear.124
We used three methods of eliciting judgments of undesirability, an anchored scale, a vague scale,125
and a happiness scale. The anchored scale is anchored at the bottom by death and at the top126
by the absence of the disorder being rated. The vague scale was anchored at the bottom by127
“extremely undesirable” and at the top by “not undesirable at all.” The happiness scale asked128
about the overall effect of the disorder on happiness. Both ends were vaguely described: “greatly129
increased happiness” and “greatly decreased happiness.”130
The third main question concerns judgments of self vs. others. For each scale, subjects judged131
for themselves and for someone else. A Self-Other difference might help to explain past findings of132
a Have–Not-have discrepancy.133
2.1 Method134
Eighty subjects completed a questionnaire on the World Wide Web, at http://www.psych.upenn.135
edu/~baron/qs.html. Their ages ranged from 16 to 60 (median 34); 27.6% were male; 15% were136
students. Most subjects had completed other studies on other topics at the same site. They had137
originally discovered it either through search engines, links from other sites (such as those listing138
ways to earn money on the web), or “word of mouth.” In general, the population of visitors to139
this site, while not all U.S. residents, has about the same median education and income as the U.S.140
adult population. Other than the subjects being web users, their most salient characteristic is that141
they are mostly women. The questionnaire began:142
Have vs. Not-have 8
Preference for health conditions143
The following study concerns judgments of chronic health conditions. . . .144
One [type of] question concerns undesirability, which means the strength of preference145
for not having the condition.146
[Another type of] question concerns the effect of the condition on overall happiness or147
unhappiness.148
You will make the undesirability ratings from two points of view. One is your own point149
of view, if you had the condition. If you have or have had it, please pay attention to150
the description, and think about that rather than your own case.151
The other is the point of view of the average person.152
In each case, imagine that either you or the average person has had the condition for153
6 months. Also, the condition will not change in the foreseeable future. It will not154
get better, and it will not get worse. This is important. Do not suppose that it will155
improve.156
A typical item (one screen) using the anchored scale for both Self and Other ratings is:157
Item 1 out of 45:158
Suppose that you had the condition: bad knee — running is painful.159
For yourself, on a scale of undesirability in which 0 is ’not having’ bad knee (with160
everything else the same) and161
100 is ’imminent death’, where would you put bad knee?162
Now suppose that the average person had bad knee (running is painful).163
Where do you think that the average person would put bad knee on the same scale?164
165
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The description for the vague scale was, “on a scale of undesirability in which 0 is ’not unde-166
sirable at all’ and 100 is ’extremely undesirable’.” The description for the happiness scale was “on167
a scale of happiness/unhappiness in which 5 is ’greatly increased happiness from the condition’,168
0 is ’no change in happiness from the condition’, and -5 is ’greatly decreased happiness from the169
condition.” (Formatting is omitted here.) Each subject used one scale type at a time, for all the170
disorders. The order of the three types was randomized across subjects.171
With each scale type, the subject rated the following 15 health conditions, shown here with172
their brief descriptions:173
asthma attacks of breathing difficulty — 1 per week
chronic back pain running is impossible and walking difficult
bad knee running is painful
inability to walk requires a wheelchair
insomnia 2 hours less sleep than desired on most nights
migraines debilitating 2 hour headaches — 2 per week
short stature 6 inches shorter than average for sex
excessive weight 50% more than normal weight
nearsightedness glasses required
partial deafness hearing aid required
nightmares frightening dreams most nights
acne pimples all over face
smoking habit pack a day of cigarettes
arthritis pain in hips or shoulders with any movement
heart disease chest pain from walking or other activity
174
After completing all the ratings, the subjects were asked, “Which of the following conditions175
have you had yourself for at least a year? (You may include conditions that were more or less176
severe than the descriptions used here.)” They saw a list of the conditions (disorders), with a letter177
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before each, and they were asked to type the letters.178
2.2 Results179
2.2.1 Not-have–Have discrepancy180
To look for a Not-have–Have discrepancy effect, we first standardized the ratings for each disorder181
across subjects (separately for Self and Other ratings with each of the three scales). This removed182
the effect of differences in the seriousness of disorders. (Otherwise, we would expect that Have183
would seem less serious than Not-have simply because the less serious disorders are more frequent.)184
Then we eliminated disorders that were rare in our sample. Because of the standardization,185
rare disorders could end up with extreme z scores. As it happened, four of the disorders (inability186
to walk, partial deafness, nightmares, and heart disease) occurred in 4 subjects or fewer, and all187
others occurred in 11 subjects or more, so we dropped these four health disorders from further188
analysis of the Not-have–Have discrepancy.189
We then computed the mean of the standardized Have disorders for each subject, separately for190
Self and Other ratings and for the different scales, and the mean of the Not-have disorders. Table 1191
summarizes the main results by scale type and type of difference (with p levels based on two-tailed192
t tests). Note that numbers refer to seriousness so that larger numbers are worse.193
— Insert Table 1 —
The results showed a clear Not-have–Have discrepancy, when we combined the results from all194
three scales (which was possible, since all had been standardized). Have was considered less serious195
than Not-have. Across subjects, combining Self and Other, the mean z-score difference between196
Not-have and Have was .13 (t74 = 2.23, p = .0291, across subjects — note that somewhat different197
subjects are involved in different analyses because of missing data). The effect was present for both198
Self (difference .11, t = 1.83, p = .0728) and Other (difference .14, t = 2.27, p = .0260). It is199
apparent that the Self-other by Not-have–Have interaction did not appear. The effects was at least200
as large for Other as for Self.201
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Our main hypothesis was that the Not-have–Have discrepancy would be larger for the vaguer202
scales. This was not supported. Table 1 shows the relevant results. Although the discrepancy was203
significant for the anchored and happiness scale and not for the vague scale, the three scales did204
not differ significantly in the size of the discrepancy. Importantly, the discrepancy was found for205
the anchored scale.206
2.2.2 Self-Other difference207
To examine the Self-Other difference, we used all health disorders (since this difference was between208
questions presented on the same screen and thus had less error). First, we looked for an overall Self-209
Other difference across all three measures. To do this, we used the actual ratings (not standardized),210
but we multiplied the happiness ratings by −20 to roughly equate the scales (because most ratings211
were between 0 and −5). Table 2 shows the results for each scale (again, with high numbers212
representing worse health).213
— Insert Table 2 —
Combining the three measures, the overall difference amounted to a mean of 2.0 points on the214
100 point scale, with ratings more severe for other than self. As shown in Table 2, the difference215
was significant overall and for the anchored scale. Again, the differences among scales in the size216
of the effect were not significant.217
It thus appears that the Self-Other discrepancy exists as hypothesized, and it therefore may218
account somewhat for the Have–Not-have discrepancy when Have’s are asked about themselves and219
Not-have’s are asked about others.220
Although we had no particular hypothesis about the interaction between scale type and Other-221
Self, it appears, again, that the anchored scale is most sensitive to the difference.222
2.2.3 Differences among disorders223
The Not-have–Have discrepancy depended on the disorder. To show this, we asked whether dis-224
orders with a higher discrepancy in one half of the subjects were also higher in the other half.225
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We measured the mean discrepancy for the odd-numbered subjects for each disorder (combining226
all three measures) and the mean for the even-numbered subjects. The two sets of means were227
correlated across the 15 disorders (r = .74, p = .0013 one tailed). Table 3 shows, in the rightmost228
column, the Not-have–Have discrepancy for the different disorders. Although we made an effort to229
find all the usable common disorders, it seems that the overall result of a positive discrepancy was230
an artifact of our sample, and a different sample might have yielded even a reversed discrepancy.231
For example, migraines seem to be worse to those who have them than to those who do not. (The232
rare disorders are in parentheses. While these numbers are suggestive of similar results, recall that233
only four subjects or fewer had each of these disorders.)234
We found the same kind of consistency across scale measures for the Self-Other difference235
(r = .89). The means for the disorders are shown in Table 3. Table 3 also shows the mean severity236
ratings (averaging all three measures, with happiness multiplied by −20 before averaging).237
— Insert Table 3 —
3 Experiment 2238
The main result of Experiment 1 was a failure to find a larger discrepancy between Haves and239
Not-haves in the vague scale or in the happiness scale than in the anchored scale. The happiness240
scale did, however, show a slightly larger discrepancy than the other two scales. Moreover, the use241
of “increased happiness” and “decreased happiness” in the description of the happiness scale might242
have tended to reduce the tendency to think of one’s own disorder as a reference point. Such a243
tendency is one of the mechanisms that could lead to a smaller discrepancy for the happiness scale.244
It is possible that a scale focusing more explicitly on quality of life, rather than seriousness of245
a health state, might show a larger discrepancy. Especially when the reference points are vague,246
people with a disorder may tend to think about others with the same disorder when they evaluate247
their quality of life.248
In Experiment 2 (actually done after Experiment 3), we asked four questions, with vague vs.249
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specific crossed with severity (of an disorder) vs. quality of life (QOL).250
3.1 Method251
Ninety-nine subjects completed a questionnaire on the World Wide Web. Their ages ranged from252
19 to 68 (median 36); 22.2% were male; 11% were students. The questionnaire began:253
Health conditions254
The following study concerns judgments of chronic health conditions. There are 40255
questions (screens). Each question presents a short description of a health condition256
and asks one of two types of rating question.257
One question concerns health. We ask you to rate the health condition on a 50-100 scale.258
Questions differ in how 50 and 100 are defined. Pay attention to these definitions.259
The other question concerns the overall quality of life of those who have the condition.260
Note: You can go below 50 if you feel that a condition is worse than the definition of261
”50”.262
You will make the ratings from two points of view. One is your own point of view,263
supposing that you have the condition. If you have really had the condition, please pay264
attention to the description of the condition, which may be more or less serious than265
your own case.266
The other point of view is that of the average person who gets the condition described.267
In each case, imagine that either you or the average person has had the condition for268
at least 6 months. Also, the condition will not change in the foreseeable future. It will269
not get better, and it will not get worse. Do not suppose that it will improve.270
A typical question, in the QOL-specific condition, appeared as follows (with the definitions of271
100 and 50 in green and red, respectively):272
Have vs. Not-have 14
Suppose that you had the condition: acne — pimples all over face.273
For yourself, on a scale of overall quality of life in which274
100 is as good as that of someone with a meaningful job, friends, family, and good275
health, and276
50 is as bad as that of someone who cannot walk more than 10 feet because of partial277
paralysis, has a dull job, and no close family or friends,278
where would you put acne?279
Now suppose that the average person had acne (pimples all over face).280
Where do you think that the average person would put acne on the same scale?281
The scale definitions for the QOL-vague condition were: “100 is a very good quality of life and282
50 is a very poor quality of life.” (We used 50 to make it easier for subjects to assign number below283
the bottom anchor.) For the health-specific condition they were: “100 is as healthy as a 20-year-old284
with no health conditions and 50 is as serious as being unable to walk more than 10 feet because of285
partial paralysis.” and for the health-vague condition they were, “100 is very good health and 50286
is very poor health.” The four conditions were blocked, and in a different random order for each287
subjects.288
The health states were chosen on the basis of previous studies to be common. Their order289
randomized separately for each subject. Their definitions were:290
Asthma: attacks of breathing difficulty — 1 per week
Back pain: pain from lifting objects
Insomnia: 2 hours less sleep than desired on most nights
Shortness: 6 inches shorter than average height for sex
Overweight: inability to lose excess weight
Nearsightedness: glasses required
Acne: pimples all over face
Smoking habit: uncontrollable addiction to cigarettes
Arthritis: pain in hips or shoulders with some movements
Heart disease: occasional chest pain from climbing stairs291
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At the end of the study, subjects again indicated which disorders they had for at least a year.292
3.2 Results293
Table 4 shows the mean ratings for the four conditions (after elimination of bad data, as we shall294
describe). Here, high numbers represent good health or good QOL. It is apparent that the four295
measures agreed closely on the relative seriousness of the health states, and the health states vary296
considerably in seriousness. Some subjects seemed to misunderstand the scale for some condition297
blocks. To assess misunderstanding, we correlated each subject’s scores in each block with the ten298
means based on all four conditions. We eliminated blocks when the correlation was less than .25.299
This resulted in deletion of 16.3% of the data. Two subjects had all their data deleted, and 58 had300
no data deleted. All statistical analysis is based on whatever data were available.301
— Insert Table 4 —
As is apparent in Table 4, Self ratings are consistently higher (less severe) than Other ratings,302
as found in Experiment 1 (mean difference of 2.01, t57 = 6.77, p = 0.0000). Specific ratings are303
also higher than vague ratings (mean difference 3.02, t57 = 5.68, p = 0.0000), but this is surely304
the result of the specific scale definitions, not a general result. Health and QOL ratings did not305
differ significantly. Self-Other difference was slightly greater for health than for QOL (t57 = 2.55,306
p = 0.0135); this too does not seem to imply any general conclusion.307
Figure 1 shows the results for the Not-have vs. Have discrepancy for the ten health states and308
the four conditions (for Self and Other combined); positive numbers indicate that Not-have’s rate309
the disorder as worse than Have’s. We did not find an overall Not-have–Have discrepancy, even for310
Self. This was because the health states differed in the direction of this effect, as is apparent from311
Figure 1. The correlation across disorders between the discrepancy measures for two halves of the312
sample (computed as in Experiment 1) was .49 (p = .0771, one tailed).313
— Insert Figure 1 —
Although the overall discrepancy (Have less severe than Not-have) was not significant, we314
note, first, that it was greater for Self (0.063) than for Other (0.030, in contrast to Experiment 1,315
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t54 = 2.22, p = 0.0303).316
It is also apparent (from Figure 1) that the discrepancy, to the extent to which we find it,317
was no larger for QOL than for health. In fact, it was nearly significant for health alone in the318
Self condition (mean 0.25, t69 = 1.92, p = 0.0596) and in the opposite direction for QOL (-0.17),319
resulting in a significantly greater discrepancy (Have higher than Not-have) for health than for320
QOL (t63 = 3.03, p = 0.0036). This result starkly contradicts the hypothesis that the discrepancy321
would be greater for QOL.322
Similarly, the discrepancy was no larger for vague than specific. Again, we found the opposite323
(t63 = −2.23, p = 0.0291): the Not-have–Have discrepancy was greater (higher ratings for Have)324
in the specific than in the vague condition.325
4 Experiment 3326
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to ask whether the discrepancy effect was the result of a focusing327
illusion. The idea of a focusing illusion is that, when people are asked about a difference between328
two disorders, they focus on the attributes of those disorders that are different, because of the way329
the question is asked. They thus exaggerate the magnitude of the difference. For example, people330
asked to compare life in California with life in the midwestern states of the U.S. focused on the331
weather, thus overestimating the benefits of living in California [14]. Likewise, people who do not332
have a disorder could focus on the attributes of life that are more affected by that disorder.333
As we explained in the Introduction, a previous study [15] found no evidence for a focusing334
illusion as an explanation of the Have–Not-have discrepancy. The study tried to reduce such an335
illusion, if it existed, by calling subjects’ attention to a variety of attributes that characterize the336
goodness of life. Asking subjects how a disorder affected each of these dimensions did not affect337
their subsequent rating of the same disorder.338
Ubel et al. [15] used rare conditions, such as below-the-knee amputation and paraplegia, so339
they were unable to make the Not-have–Have comparison in their sample (jurors). We do not know340
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whether they would have found a discrepancy effect, if they had done so. Also, it is possible that341
subjects may have understood that the disorders did not affect all life attributes equally, yet, still,342
reverted to the focusing illusion even after they were forced to consider all the attributes.343
In the present experiment, we followed the basic design of Ubel et al. In particular, we first344
asked for holistic ratings, then we asked for attribute-by-attribute ratings, and finally we asked for345
holistic ratings again. However, we asked about the attribute-by-attribute ratings in a way that346
allows us to do a rough calculation of utility based on multi-attribute utility theory [20]. We thus347
call this a MAU elicitation. In particular, we asked for numerical ratings on each of seven attributes,348
each with a clearly anchored endpoint. At the end of the experiment we asked for weights of these349
attributes. To calculate the MAU (multi-attribute utility) of each disorder for each subject, we350
multiplied each attribute rating by the weight of that attribute and then added up these products351
across the seven attributes.352
If the Not-have–Have discrepancy results from a focusing illusion, it should largely disappear in353
the MAU ratings, because subjects were forced to rate attributes one at a time. Thus, even if the354
effect of this forced variety is limited to the MAU task itself, we should be able to detect it. We do355
not need to rely on transfer to the subsequent holistic rating task.356
For the holistic question, we used paralysis from the waist down as the standard, rather than357
death, because we thought that people might be reluctant to say that a disorder they had was358
anywhere near as bad as death.359
4.1 Method360
Seventy-nine subjects completed a questionnaire on the World Wide Web. Their ages ranged from361
18 to 74 (median 36); 33% were male; 14% were students.362
The questionnaire began:363
Preference for health conditions364
This study concerns judgments of chronic health conditions. It has 24 screens. Please365
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read all of these instructions carefully.366
In each question, you will see a short description of a health condition, and you will367
answer one of two types of questions.368
One question concerns undesirability, which means the strength of preference for not369
having the condition. This type of question will come first, and then it will be repeated370
at the end. Do not worry about whether your answer is the same or not. Just try to371
answer accurately both times.372
You answer this question on a scale where 0 means “not having the condition” and 100373
means “as bad as being paralyzed from the waist down.” You can use numbers greater374
than 100 if necessary (but no greater than 200).375
The other type of question concerns the negative effect of the condition on several376
domains of your life:377
1. Pain and discomfort378
2. Economic standard of living379
3. Work380
4. Love life381
5. Family life other than love life382
6. Spiritual life broadly defined383
7. Leisure activities other than family life384
Please try to interpret these descriptions so that they do not count the same effects385
twice. For example, if “spiritual life” includes communing with nature, do not also386
count this as part of “leisure”.387
You answer these questions on a scale where 0 means “no negative effect” and the388
meaning of 100 is specified in the question. If you think that some health condition has389
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a positive effect, then use a negative number for your response. Remember, this390
question is about negative effects.391
At the end, you will be asked a few additional questions.392
Each question asks you to “suppose that you had” the condition. Of course, you may393
actually have it now. If so, please pay attention to the description, which may be more394
or less severe than your own case. Rate that description, not your own case.395
In each case, imagine that you have had the condition for 6 months. Also, the condition396
will not change in the foreseeable future. It will not get better, and it will not get worse.397
This is important. Do not suppose that it will improve.398
We used the following disorders, which had showed a discrepancy in the hypothesized direction399
in Experiment 1 (except for heart disease, which was modified to be less severe).400
asthma attacks of breathing difficulty — 1 per week
insomnia 2 hours less sleep than desired on most nights
short stature 6 inches shorter than average for sex
nearsightedness glasses required
acne pimples all over face
smoking habit pack a day of cigarettes
arthritis pain in hips or shoulders with any movement
heart disease occasional chest pain from climbing stairs
401
For the holistic task, a typical question read.402
Suppose that you had the condition: arthritis – pain in hips or shoulders with any403
movement. On a scale of overall undesirability in which404
0 is not having arthritis (with everything else the same) and405
100 is waist-down paralysis,406
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where would you put407
arthritis?408
For the MAU task, a typical question read:409
Suppose that you had the condition: insomnia – 2 hours less sleep than desired on most410
nights. Rate this condition for its negative effect on each of the following domains of411
your life. 0 means ’no negative effect at all.’ 100 is defined for each question. (Use a412
negative number for a positive effect.)413
1. Pain, fatigue, and discomfort: 0 = no effect; 100 = as bad as death.414
2. Economic standard of living: 0 = no effect; 100 = dire poverty.415
3. Work: 0 = no effect; 100 = unable to do any work.416
4. Love life: 0 = no effect; 100 = love life nonexistent.417
5. Family life: 0 = no effect; 100 = family life nonexistent.418
6. Spiritual life: 0 = no effect; 100 = spiritual life nonexistent.419
7. Leisure activities: 0 = no effect; 100 = activities nonexistent.420
The order of health conditions was randomized separately for each subject and then fixed for421
the three parts of the questionnaire.422
The weight elicitation, at the end of the questionnaire, read.423
Now please rate each of the following on a scale where 0 represents ’not bad at all’ and424
100 represents ’as bad as paralysis from the waist down’. When you make these ratings,425
think only about the thing you are rating. Try to imagine that everything else is the426
same. (This is hard, but do your best.)427
Then subjects saw a list of all the lower ends of each scale in the MAU task, e.g, “Pain, fatigue,428
and discomfort as bad as death.”429
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4.2 Results430
Seven subjects were dropped because they gave 0 responses to all or most of the holistic questions431
in one section (including the more serious disorders) or because they gave 0 to all the questions432
about weights. Also, some subjects were dropped from some analyses. In particular, subjects whose433
holistic ratings before and after the MAU ratings did not correlate positively with each other across434
disorders were dropped for analyses of the holistic ratings. When holistic ratings and MAU ratings435
correlated negatively, we dropped the one with the lowest correlation with the mean of all severity436
measures across disorders. By these criteria, we dropped one subject from analysis of the MAU437
data and 13 subjects from analysis of the holistic data. The first holistic task seemed particular438
prone to induce reversed judgments (high numbers for less serious disorders).439
To compute MAU utilities, we first re-scaled the weights for each subject so that the maximum440
weight was 1. Likewise, we rescaled the ratings so that the highest rating given by each subject441
was 1. Then we multiplied the weights by the ratings for each attribute for each disorder for each442
subject. Notice that the weights were elicited using the same end points as those used in the rating443
task.444
To assess the Not-have–Have discrepancy, we used the standardized responses as in Experiment445
1. We also standardized the MAU utilities by disease.446
The Not-have–Have discrepancy was significant overall, averaging the holistic (averaged over447
the two parts) and MAU ratings (mean difference .16 in terms of standardized scores, t61 = 2.19,448
p = .0320, two tailed; positive numbers mean that Have is less serious than Not-have). It was also449
significant for the MAU ratings (mean 0.15, t = 2.51, p = .0144) but not for the holistic ratings450
(mean 0.14, t64 = 1.57, p = .1213). These results are a clear rejection of the focusing hypothesis,451
which predicted an effect for the holistic ratings but not for the MAU ratings.452
Again, the discrepancy varied across disorders, as shown in Figure 2. The split half correlation453
across the eight disorders in the discrepancy (computed as in Experiments 1 and 2) was 0.70454
(p = .0257 one tailed, with 6 df).455
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— Insert Figure 2 —
The pattern of attribute ratings should vary by disorder. To test whether this was true, we456
performed an analysis of variance of the attribute ratings, using subject, attribute and disorder457
as factors. Importantly, the interaction between attribute and disorder was significant (F42,3276 =458
28.05, p = .0000). Main effects of attribute and disorder were also large and significant. Table 5459
shows the mean ratings, on a scale where the worse end of each attribute is 1 and “no effect” is460
0, and the Not-have–Have discrepancy on the same scale. The interaction between attribute and461
disorder is illustrated by the high numbers for the effect of arthritis on pain and the effect of acne462
(and shortness) on love life.463
— Insert Table 5 —
We examined the Not-have–Have discrepancy for each attribute. The largest discrepancies were464
those for family life (t72 = 3.18, p = .0022, two tailed), love life (t = 2.10, p = .0396), and spiritual465
life (t = 3.53, p = .0007). The effect for work was nearly significant (t = 1.75). No other effect466
was significant by the usual criterion, although all were in the hypothesized direction, including467
pain and discomfort. These results suggest that those who do not have the disorders may fail to468
recognize how little effect they have on some domains.469
5 Discussion470
Our results indicate that the Have–Not-have discrepancy can be studied with in web respondents471
and common disorders. Although a minority of subjects had each disorder, most of them had at472
least one. For more general purposes the list could be expanded to include other aspects of life473
aside from health, such as being single, poor, unemployed — or good things such as being wealthy.474
Indeed, we may have done this by include shortness as a disorder. We have no reason to think that475
the general principles underlying the discrepancy would differ for non-health states.476
We found consistent differences among disorders in the magnitude and direction of the dis-477
crepancy. One possible explanation of these differences — and there may well be more than one478
Have vs. Not-have 23
— is that the usual discrepancy (Not-have worse than Have) is found for disorders that have an479
external manifestation, visible to others, while the opposite is found for disorders that involve pain480
or un-expressed emotion. Further research should examine these differences among disorders.481
Our main conclusion is that vague scales are not the cause of the discrepancy. If anything, the482
discrepancy is larger when scales have more precise anchors. Thus, the discrepancy is not a simple483
artifact of the use of vague scales. Note, however, that this finding does not excuse the use of such484
scales. For other purposes, the tendency to chose an anchor close to one’s own condition may affect485
the conclusions drawn.486
A limitation of this conclusion follows from our use of within-subject designs. It is possible that487
those who have a disorder recalibrate their entire scale for judgments of all disorders (or of their488
absence). If, for example, a paraplegic rated himself as “happy,” he might still believe that others489
are happier and rate a typical person without paraplegia as “ecstatic.” We do not think that such a490
general re-calibration is likely for the kinds of scales we used, for the kinds of minor disorders that491
we studied, but such recalibration may exist elsewhere. If it exists, a different design is required to492
detect it.493
We also found further evidence that de-focusing manipulations do not reduce the discrepancy.494
Unlike earlier studies, these results did not rely on the carry-over from a de-focusing manipulation495
to another task. We found the discrepancy in the MAU task itself.496
Also, if the focusing hypothesis were true, we might have found a larger discrepancy for health497
than for QOL in Experiments 1 and 2 (especially Experiment 2, which was better controlled), and498
we did not find this. Instead, we found a larger discrepancy for health than for quality of life in499
Experiment 2.500
The focusing hypothesis is not quite dead, however. It is possible that, even within a life domain,501
people with a disorder focus on sub-attributes of that domain that are less affected by the disorder.502
It may be difficult to draw a line between “attributes” and “activities,” however. It may therefore503
be difficult to distinguish this form of the focusing hypothesis from other hypotheses that involve504
knowledge of specific adaptations (such as using a computer for reading when one is blind).505
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Finally, people think they will adapt better than others. In Experiment 2, this is more true506
when they have in fact adapted (Haves). This result could explain some of the discrepancy found in507
previous studies, if people who do not have the disorder think about others rather than themselves.508
The main remaining explanations of the discrepancy are failure of Not-haves to predict adap-509
tation and self-deception. This is an important distinction. Adaptation is real, and self-deception510
is, in an important sense, false. We may think of people’s values in terms of what Keeney calls511
fundamental values and means values [21]. People’s good is in their fundamental values. (These512
may include wanting their means values honored.) Means values are connected to fundamental513
values through beliefs. If beliefs are false, then the means values lose their claim to represent a per-514
son’s good [22]. Thus, when we help people make decisions, we do not do them any good when we515
honor their values based on self-deception and when these conflict with their fundamental values. If516
people with disabilities are deceiving themselves about how close to normal they are, then, to this517
extent, we should discount their judgments and work harder to cure and prevent their disorders518
than their own judgments would imply.519
On the other side, mis-prediction of adaptation is a false belief held by Not-haves. To the520
extent to which adaptation is real and not predicted, then we should discount these judgments521
in evaluating the seriousness of disorders. Of course, both kinds of error could be true. And our522
results suggest a different kind of Not-have error as well, a failure to appreciate the seriousness of523
disorders that have no external manifestation.524
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Table 1: Relationship between scale type and discrepancy, in z scores of seriousness (mean of Self
and Other, common disorderss only), Experiment 1.
Scale type Haves Not-haves p
Anchored −0.08 0.04 .0430
Vague −0.03 0.02 n.s.
Happiness −0.13 0.04 .0479
Overall −0.08 0.03 .0291
Table 2: Relationship between scale type and Self-Other difference, in seriousness scores on a rough
100 point scale (higher numbers representing worse health), all disorders, Experiment 1.
Scale type Self Other p
Anchored 38.7 41.2 .0028
Vague 55.9 56.8 n.s.
Happiness 44.9 47.6 .0609
Overall 46.5 48.5 .0105
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Table 3: Mean severity ratings for the 11 common disorders, and Self-Other (positive for Other
worse than Self) and Not-have–Have differences (positive for Not-have worse than Have), Experi-
ment 1 (ordered by discrepancy).
Mean Self-Other Not-have–Have
Health Number severity difference difference
disorder having (0–100 scale) (0–100 scale) (z scores)
Smoking 23 41.9 −14.0 0.41
Acne 13 43.6 4.2 0.39
Short 29 25.5 12.1 0.32
Insom 22 37.3 3.2 0.09
Asthma 11 49.2 3.2 0.09
Arthritis 18 56.5 0.8 0.05
Nearsgt 43 21.7 6.5 0.04
Back 21 65.1 −1.6 −0.01
Weight 10 56.0 0.5 −0.02
Knee 12 38.1 4.0 −0.11
Migr 22 56.4 −0.8 −0.15
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Table 4: Mean ratings in Experiment 2, for ten health states in the four conditions, for self and
other (based on cleaned-up data); higher numbers represent better health.
Health QOL
specific vague specific vague
Nearsighted self 92.1 92.3 91.0 90.1
other 89.5 87.9 88.8 88.0
Short self 90.7 90.0 90.9 90.1
other 86.1 85.3 86.6 85.5
Acne self 87.1 83.4 88.3 84.2
other 82.3 78.4 82.9 80.8
Insomnia self 83.5 79.4 82.3 79.8
other 80.7 77.1 81.1 78.9
Back self 81.8 75.6 77.9 76.4
other 78.8 74.6 75.9 75.5
Asthma self 80.2 76.5 76.9 73.8
other 77.2 73.2 74.8 72.5
Overweight self 78.3 77.3 76.8 72.3
other 75.2 73.5 74.9 70.0
Smoking self 80.4 72.4 74.3 70.4
other 78.3 73.6 75.9 71.6
Arthritis self 77.8 74.4 73.8 72.5
other 74.8 71.4 72.2 71.6
Heart self 74.7 71.3 70.6 67.8
other 71.4 68.6 68.6 66.2
MEAN self 82.7 79.3 80.3 77.8
other 79.4 76.4 78.2 76.1
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Table 5: Mean ratings and discrepancies in these ratings as a function of attribute and disorder,
Experiment 3; higher numbers represent worse health.
Pain Econ Work Love Family Spirit Leisure
Mean disutility ratings
Asthma 0.49 0.20 0.31 0.22 0.18 0.09 0.42
Insomnia 0.39 0.19 0.41 0.27 0.30 0.14 0.37
Short 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.32 0.12 0.07 0.15
Nearsighted 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.15
Acne 0.22 0.15 0.21 0.59 0.19 0.09 0.24
Smoking 0.33 0.37 0.21 0.31 0.28 0.16 0.29
Arthritis 0.74 0.41 0.60 0.44 0.31 0.11 0.62
Heart 0.64 0.29 0.48 0.38 0.30 0.12 0.52
Mean Not-have–Have discrepancy in disutility
Asthma 0.08 −0.02 0.06 −0.03 −0.01 −0.07 0.01
Insomnia −0.05 0.02 0.02 0.17 −0.04 −0.08 0.01
Short 0.03 0.09 −0.07 0.00 0.11 0.05 0.02
Nearsighted −0.02 −0.04 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 −0.04
Acne −0.01 0.02 0.02 −0.02 0.01 −0.08 0.03
Smoking −0.08 −0.01 0.03 0.10 0.10 −0.01 −0.02
Arthritis 0.08 −0.02 −0.03 −0.08 −0.02 0.06 −0.14
Heart 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.03 −0.05 −0.01 −0.12
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Figure 1: Have–Not-have discrepancy by disorder and method, Experiment 2. Positive numbers
indicate that Not-have’s rate the disorder as worse than Have’s.
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Figure 2: Have–Not-have discrepancy by disorder and method, Experiment 3. Positive numbers
indicate that Not-have’s rate the disorder as worse than Have’s.
